There exists a substantial divide between the empirical and survey evidence regarding the influence of sell-side analyst recommendations on the trading of mutual funds. While surveys of fund managers suggest that they assign little weight to analyst recommendations, the empirical evidence suggests their trading is heavily influenced by analyst recommendations. Nonetheless, the existing empirical evidence does not readily yield robust inferences as to the direction of causality in the relation between the trading of mutual funds and analyst recommendations. Our study thus meets the pressing need to undertake a large-sample empirical study to understand the behaviour of these important capital market participants.
Introduction
Mutual funds expend considerable resources to gain timely access to analyst research and recommendations (Diefenbach, 1972) . Nonetheless, surveys of fund managers consistently indicate that although they value analysts' industry knowledge, they assign little weight to analyst recommendations when making portfolio decisions. In 2008, a survey of more than 3,000 fund managers published by the industry journal, Institutional Investor, found that managers regard stock selection as the least important of 12 sell-side analyst attributes. Indeed, fund managers have ranked stock selection as amongst the three least important analyst attributes in each of the Institutional Investor surveys since 2005. However, survey responses are not necessarily a reliable indicator of actual behaviour. Indeed, the limited empirical evidence in this area supports the notion that managed funds trade in a manner consistent with analyst recommendations. Chen and Cheng (2006) , for instance, report that changes in aggregate institutional ownership are positively and significantly related to the level of consensus recommendations in the same quarter. Moreover, they note that the impact of analyst recommendations on the trading of institutional investors is economically significant. In dollar terms, institutions increase their holdings of firms with favourable recommendations by approximately $US 12 billion each quarter relative to firms with unfavourable recommendations. However, Chen and Cheng's study does not readily yield robust inferences as to the direction of causality in the relation between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst recommendations. The contemporaneous relation they report could equally be consistent with the notion that analysts change their recommendations in response to the trading of their institutional clients. Thus, there remains a pressing need to undertake large-sample empirical analysis to understand how mutual funds use the research of sell-side analysts.
We examine three fundamental questions about the manner in which mutual funds use the research of sell-side analysts:
1. Do mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with sell-side analysts' recommendations?
2. Are there certain analysts whose recommendation changes consistently influence the trading of mutual funds? Following Chen and Cheng (2006) , we hypothesise that mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with consensus recommendations and the recommendations of individual analysts. Formally, our first hypothesis stated in alternate form is:
H 1: Changes in mutual fund holdings are positively related to the level of (and changes in) sellside analysts' recommendations. Mikhail, Walther and Willis (2004) find that a subset of analysts consistently makes more profitable recommendations than their peers. Moreover, they report that the market reaction to recommendations issued by these skilful analysts is greater than that for recommendations issued by other analysts. Accordingly, we hypothesise that there are a subset of analysts whose recommendations consistently exert more influence on the trading of mutual funds than their peers.
Formally, our second hypothesis stated in the alternate form is:
H 2 : Analysts rated as most influential in one period will exhibit significantly greater influence than their peers in a subsequent period. Stickel (1995) reports that the price reaction to buy recommendations issued by analysts included in the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team is significantly greater than that associated with buy recommendations issued by other analysts. This suggests that analysts who are perceived to be more skilful may exert greater influence on the trading of their institutional clients than their less highly acclaimed peers. Formally, our third hypothesis stated in the alternate form is therefore:
H 3 : Analysts who appear in the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team at least once during the sample period exert significantly greater influence on the trading of mutual funds than analysts that do not.
Our study makes five significant contributions to the literature. First, we use individual mutual fund holdings and detailed analyst recommendations to test whether the recommendation changes of individual analysts help to explain the trading of mutual funds at the individual fund level. In contrast, prior studies limit their analysis to changes in institutional ownership at the aggregate level and analyst recommendations at the consensus level. While we undertake analysis at this level, we also 4 David Costello and Jason Hall UQ Business School, The University of Queensland extend the literature by examining the relation between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst recommendations at the individual analyst and fund level. An implication of this research design is that we employ a dataset that is many times larger than those used in prior research. Accordingly, our study represents by far the most comprehensive investigation of the relation between the trading of mutual funds and analyst recommendations undertaken to date. Second, our study is the first to include prior quarter recommendation changes as an independent variable in the regression analysis. Previous studies consider only the contemporaneous recommendation. As previously noted, however, making reliable inferences about the direction of causality in the contemporaneous relation between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst recommendations is problematic. In contrast, an analyst's recommendation cannot possibly be influenced by mutual fund trading in the subsequent quarter. Employing this robust research design, we find strong evidence that mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with the level of and changes to analyst recommendations at the consensus and individual analyst level. This result contradicts the claims of fund managers, cited in the survey literature, that they assign little weight to the recommendations of sell-side analysts. Hence, this study underscores the importance of undertaking large sample empirical evidence to understand investor behaviour.
Third, to explore the possibility of reverse causality or a feedback relation between mutual fund trading and analyst recommendations, we perform a series of Granger (1969) causality tests. Our results suggest that the relation between the trading of mutual funds and analyst recommendations is considerably more complex than has previously been acknowledged in the literature. In particular, we find that there is a feedback relation between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst recommendations, such that analyst recommendation changes cause mutual fund trading and mutual fund trading causes analyst recommendation changes.
Fourth, we find evidence that the most influential analysts exhibit persistence in their influence on the trading of mutual funds. Previous studies that have examined persistence in analyst skill focus on the profitability of an analyst's recommendations (Mikhail et al., 2004) . The results of our tests, however, suggest that their search for evidence of persistence in analyst skill may have been misplaced. Given the remuneration incentives faced by sell-side equity analysts (Cowen, Groysberg 5 David Costello and Jason Hall UQ Business School, The University of Queensland and Healy, 2006) , it is arguable that the trading volume their recommendations generate amongst their institutional clients is a more accurate measure of their skill than the profitability of their recommendations.
Finally, our results reveal something about the characteristics of those analysts whose recommendations exert the greatest influence on the trading of mutual funds. In particular, analysts included in the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team exert significantly greater influence on the trading of these managers than their less heralded peers. Moreover, we find a strong positive relation between an analyst's tenure, the influence they exert on the trading of mutual funds and their status as an All-American analyst.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in our study and the formation of key variables. Section 3 presents our research design. Results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 presents a series of Granger causality tests to examine the direction of causality in the relation between mutual fund trading and analyst recommendation changes. Section 6 concludes.
Data and variable formation
We construct our sample from the intersection of mutual funds holdings data from the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and analyst recommendations from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S). To be included in our sample, a firm must also have sufficient volume and returns data from CRSP and accounting data from I/B/E/S and Datastream to facilitate the construction of control variables. Our final sample is an unbalanced panel data set comprised of 6,535,255 quarterly observations during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008.
The CRSP Mutual Funds database provides quarterly snapshots of the holdings of all open-end US mutual funds. For each stock held by a fund in a given quarter, CRSP reports the number of shares held, the market value of those shares at the reporting date and the percentage of the fund's total net assets invested. The data are collected from reports filed with the SEC and from reports voluntarily generated by the funds. In cases where a fund reports its holdings more than once in a single quarter,
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David Costello and Jason Hall UQ Business School, The University of Queensland we retain only the most recently filed holdings. To ensure that our sample is representative of trades executed by actively managed, diversified US equity funds, we exclude all trades by index funds, taxable and municipal bond funds, international funds and money market funds. In addition, we exclude the holdings of funds that do not report holdings in any firm in the quarter previous to or following the period of interest. Such infrequent reporting may be indicative of inconsistent reporting practices that are likely to introduce noise to the fund ownership variable.
To infer mutual fund trading at the aggregate institutional level, we begin by defining the variable Inst k,t , the aggregate level of institutional ownership in stock k at the end of quarter t, as the sum of the number of shares of firm k held by all institutional investors in the CRSP Mutual Funds database in a given quarter. Our proxy for trading at the aggregate institutional level is then ΔInst k,t, the percentage change in the number of shares of firm k held by all funds in the CRSP database from quarter t-1 to t.
At the individual fund level, we infer trades by reference to the quarterly change in the portfolio weights funds apply to the stocks they hold. Focusing on portfolio weights provides a more robust proxy for the trading of an individual fund than simply measuring the change in the number of shares, as the latter measure is likely to be confounded by changes in funds under management. In particular, if funds under management increase, a fund manager whose trading is informed by the recommendation changes of sell-side analysts may respond to a recommendation downgrade by continuing to hold the same number of shares in the downgraded firm. In this instance, the manager effectively decreases their exposure to the stock relative to the total value of their portfolio although they have not executed a trade.
CRSP reports the proportion of a fund's total net assets invested in a stock as the ratio of the market value of the fund's holdings of that stock relative to the market value of the fund's entire portfolio. Accordingly, quarterly changes in the percentage of total net assets measure reported by CRSP do not exclusively reflect trades executed by a fund, but also price changes in the assets comprising the fund's portfolio. Yet changes in portfolio weights that do not arise from trades will confound our analysis. To address this potential confound, we estimate an adjusted fund holdings measure to remove the impact of price changes and changes in funds under management associated with new investment and redemptions. The construction of this variable involves five steps. First, we 7 David Costello and Jason Hall UQ Business School, The University of Queensland estimate the theoretical market value of a fund's holdings of a stock in the current quarter, assuming no change in price relative to that on the reporting date in the last quarter as, (1) where, N i,k,t is the number of shares in stock k held by fund i at the end of quarter t and P k,t-1 is the price per share as at the date fund i reported its holdings in quarter t-1. The vast majority of funds in the sample hold some proportion of their assets in securities other than equities. Although CRSP only reports the percentage of a fund's total net assets invested in equities, we infer the total market value of a fund's non-equity investments (referred to as bonds for simplicity) as follows:
, ,, 1
where N i,k,t and P k,t-1 are defined in the manner described above, K is the number of stocks in the fund's portfolio and ω i,k,t is the unadjusted proportion of fund i's total net assets invested in stock k in quarter t as reported by CRSP. For simplicity, we assume that the price of all assets other than equities remain unchanged from quarter t-1 to t.
The sum of (1) and (2) represents the total market value of a fund's portfolio, assuming no change in prices relative to those prevailing when the fund reported its holdings at the end of the previous quarter, , ,
The adjusted holdings measure is then estimated by dividing (1) by (3), as follows, , ,
Finally, ΔHolding i,k,t , our proxy for the change in portfolio weights attributable to trades executed by mutual funds in the current quarter is, 
Stock recommendations were obtained from I/B/E/S. Each database record includes the name of the firm covered, the brokerage firm and analyst issuing the report and a recommendation on a scale from 1 to 5. In I/B/E/S' scale, a rating of 1 represents a strong buy; 2, a buy; 3, a hold; 4, a sell; and 5, underperform. To allow for a more intuitive interpretation of results, we reverse the standard scale so that more favourable recommendations are assigned higher numeric values. We retain only the most recent recommendation for a stock issued by an analyst during a given quarter. I/B/E/S records a recommendation only in instances where an analyst initiates coverage of a stock, revises a previously issued recommendation or reiterates their recommendation. To ensure that there is a recommendation in each quarter during which a stock is covered by an analyst, we retain an analyst's last outstanding recommendation in subsequent quarters until they reiterate or revise their recommendation or cease coverage of the stock. Finally, to ensure that our analysis is not capturing stale recommendations, we limit our sample to analyst-firm observations with at least one recommendation change in the current or previous quarter.
Research design
To test whether mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with the recommendations of sell-side analysts, we perform a series of cross-sectional, Fama and Macbeth (1973) (6) where ΔInst k,t is the percentage change in aggregate institutional ownership in stock k from quarter t-1 to t and Lag cons rec k,t is the consensus recommendation for stock k at the end of quarter t-1. We include the lagged value of the consensus recommendation as the primary explanatory variable in this regression to confront the look-ahead bias that threatens inferences as to the direction of causality in the contemporaneous relation between mutual fund trading and analyst recommendations. Hypothesis 1 predicts that β 1 will be significantly greater than zero, indicating that, on average, mutual funds increase their holdings of stocks with more favourable consensus recommendations. We also include control variables for factors relating to mutual fund preferences, momentum trading and institutional herding that have been shown to exhibit power to explain the trading of mutual funds. Del Guercio (1996), Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) require that the forecast be within three months of the earnings announcement. Sias (2004) finds that institutional investors engage heavily in herd-like behaviour, following one another into and out of trades. We therefore include the change in aggregate institutional ownership in stock k from quarter t-1 to t to control for institutional herding. Inst k,t is measured as the sum of the number of shares in stock k held by all institutional investors who report their holdings in the CRSP Mutual Funds Database during a given quarter. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) find that the trading of mutual funds is strongly positively correlated with future stock returns. Accordingly, it is conceivable that the trading of institutional investors prompts analysts to change their recommendations. In an attempt to differentiate this alternative hypothesis from our hypothesis that the trading of mutual funds is influenced by analyst recommendations, we include the lagged dependent and primary independent variables in all of our tests to introduce elements of a Granger causality test (Granger, 1969 outstanding at the end of quarter t-1 (t-2) and 0 otherwise and the control variables are defined in the same manner outlined above.
To address the concern that a contemporaneous relation between changes in institutional ownership and consensus recommendation changes may arise because of a look-ahead bias, we include both the contemporaneous and lagged recommendation change as independent variables. No prior study has adopted this research design. Accordingly, our study has the potential to elicit more definitive inferences about the direction of causality in any relation between mutual fund trading and analyst recommendations.
We conduct t-tests to assess whether individual variables are significantly different from zero and (Lag ΔHolding i,k,t ) is the change in the proportion of fund i's total net assets invested in stock k from quarter t-1 (t-2) to quarter t (t-1), adjusted to remove the impact of price changes and changes in funds under management, Upgrade j,k,t (Lag upgrade j, k, ) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j's recommendation for stock k at the end of quarter t (t-1) is more favourable than that outstanding at the end of quarter t-1 (t-2) and 0 otherwise, Downgrade j,k,t (Lag downgrade j, k, ) is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j's recommendation for stock k at the end of quarter t (t-1) is more favourable than that outstanding at the end of quarter t-1 (t-2) and 0 otherwise and the control variables are defined in the manner outlined above.
Results

Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics for the mutual fund holdings included in the sample are presented in In Panel A of Table 2 , we present summary statistics for the analyst recommendations included in the sample. The final sample of 6,535,255 observations includes 94,686 distinct quarterly recommendations issued by 4,834 analysts during the period from the third quarter of 23003 to the 1 The product of the average number of stocks held by a fund and the average proportion of a fund's total net assets invested in a single stock is approximately 42 percent. That this figure is significantly less than 100 percent merely reflects the fact that the vast majority of funds in the sample hold some proportion of their funds in assets other than equities. Given that this is not a performance evaluation study there is no pressing need to exclude funds where the proportion of equities does not meet a defined threshold in order to ensure a consistent risk profile across funds. Barber et al. (2006) over the latter part of their sample from 1996 -2003.
In Table 3 , we present descriptive statistics for the sample data. The final sample consists of 6,535,255 observations during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008.
The size of the sample is a striking feature of our study, making it by far the most comprehensive investigation of the association between the trading of mutual funds and analyst recommendations undertaken to date. Approximately 55 percent of the firms in the sample experience a recommendation change in any given quarter. Note, however, that the apparent frequency of recommendation changes is a result of our research design. In particular, we only retain observations where an analyst issues at least one recommendation for a stock in the current or previous quarter.
This restriction was imposed in order to exclude stale recommendations. Consistent with the notion that markets became increasingly liquid throughout the period of the study, the mean quarterly change in average daily trading volume, ΔLiquid k,t is 10.22 percent. While this seems like a particularly large increase in trading volume over a single quarter, note that the distribution of the change in liquidity is positively skewed, with a median change of 5.33 percent. A factor that may partially explain the trend of increasing liquidity throughout the sample period is increasing institutional ownership, as evidenced by the mean value of Δ Inst k,t of 3.12 percent. The substantial mean year-to-date Sales growth k,t (20.53 percent) experienced by the firms in the sample points to the prosperous economic conditions prevailing throughout much of the sample period. Interestingly, however, the mean quarterly stock return, Ret k,t during the sample period is negative (-1.20 percent).
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David Costello and Jason Hall UQ Business School, The University of Queensland is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j's recommendation for stock k in quarter t is more favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. Downgrade j,k,t ¸i s an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j's recommendation for stock k in quarter t is less favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. Lag upgrade j,k,t-1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j's recommendation for stock k in quarter t-1 is more favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-2 and 0 otherwise. Lag downgrade j,t-1 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j's recommendation for stock k in quarter t-1 is less favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-2 and 0 otherwise. ΔLiquid k,t is the percentage change in the average daily trading volume in stock k from quarter t-1 to t. ΔVol k,t is the change in the standard deviation of firm k's daily stock returns from quarter t-1 to t. It is measured as ΔVol k,t =σ k,t -σ k,t-1 . Sales growth k,t is the sum of sales in quarters t-3 to t, divided by the sum of sales in quarters t-4 to t-7, minus one. Ret k,t is the return on stock k in quarter t, computed as , where r m,k is the stock return for stock k in month m. Lag ret t is the lagged quarterly return on stock k . Surprise k,t is defined as the unsplit adjusted I/B/E/S actual earnings per share for stock k in quarter t less the most recent I/B/E/S median forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the market price per share at the end of quarter t. ΔInst k,t is the percentage change in aggregate institutional ownership in stock k from quarter t-1 to quarter t. The aggregate institutional ownership in quarter t is measured as the sum of the number of shares of stock k reported as being held by institutional investors in the CRSP Mutual Funds database. Lag ΔHolding i,k is the lagged quarterly change in fund i's holding of stock k, defined as Lag ΔHolding i,k = Holding i,k,t-1 -ω i,k,t following the procedure outlined in Table 1 In 
The impact of analyst recommendations on the trading of mutual funds
In this section, we present the results of the analysis of whether mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with analyst recommendations. We undertake this analysis at two levels. Following the prior literature, we first consider whether changes in aggregate institutional ownership are explained by (i) the level of consensus recommendations and (ii) changes in consensus recommendations.
Second, we extend the literature by using detailed mutual fund holdings and analyst recommendations to test whether the recommendation changes of individual analysts help to explain the trading of mutual funds at the individual fund level. The latter question has never been addressed in the literature and the former question has never been addressed using detailed analyst recommendations and individual fund holdings. Framing the research question in this manner acknowledges that fund managers are likely to perceive certain analysts to be more skilful than others and are therefore likely to assign differing levels of importance to the recommendations of different analysts. Moreover, by undertaking the analysis using the detailed data at the individual fund and analyst level, we employ by far the largest database that has been used to test whether analyst recommendations inform the trading decisions of mutual fund managers. Our study is therefore likely to elicit more subtle and robust inferences than prior research. (1996) , changes in institutional ownership are positively and significantly related to changes in liquidity. This is consistent with the notion that institutional investors face constraints to holding large positions in illiquid stocks arising from the need to meet redemptions (Gompers & Metrick, 2001 ). Moreover, because institutional investors trade frequently, their performance is likely to be highly sensitive to trading costs. It follows that they may be discouraged from investing in illiquid stocks that are characterised by large bid-ask spreads. As liquidity increases these constraints are likely to be less binding. Prior research, including that of Del Guercio (1996), Falkenstein (1996) and Gompers and Metrick (2001) finds a positive relation between institutional ownership and returns volatility.
Aggregate institutional ownership and the consensus recommendation level
Contrary to these findings, the average coefficient on ΔVol k,t , is negative (-0.544) and marginally significant at the 10 percent level. As hypothesised, the coefficient on Sales growth k,t is positive (0.046) and significant at less than the one percent level. This result is consistent with prior evidence that institutional investors exhibit a preference for stocks with strong recent operating performance (Gompers & Metrick, 2001 ). Grinblatt et al. (1995) report that the vast majority of mutual funds use momentum as one of their stock selection criteria. Consistent with this finding, the coefficients on the quarterly stock return and lagged quarterly stock return are both positive (0.112 and 0.148 respectively) and significant at less than the one percent level. The coefficient on Surprise k,t , is 21 David Costello and Jason Hall UQ Business School, The University of Queensland negative (-0.038), but insignificant at usual levels of significance. Doyle et al. (2006) document that the stocks that experience the greatest earnings surprise tend to be neglected stocks, characterised by high transaction costs, a high degree of illiquidity and limited institutional ownership. The insignificance of the earnings surprise variable may therefore reflect the existence of barriers to institutional ownership amongst the stocks that experience the greatest earnings surprise. Lag ΔInst k,t-1, the lagged quarterly change in aggregate institutional ownership, is negative (-0.115) and highly significant. The results therefore provide no evidence of institutional herding (Sias, 2004) but are consistent with aggregate changes in institutional ownership following a mean reverting process, perhaps driven by funds attempting to exploit what they perceive to be market inefficiencies. is the consensus recommendation for stock k in quarter t computed by averaging all outstanding recommendations in the quarter. ΔLiquid k,t is the percentage change in average daily trading volume in stock k from quarter t-1 to quarter t. ΔVol k,t is the change in the standard deviation of firm k's daily stock returns from quarter t-1 to t. It is measured as ΔVol k,t = . Sales growth k,t is the sum of sales in the four most recent fiscal quarters (t-3 to t) divided by the sum of sales in quarters t-4 to t-7, minus one. Ret k,t is the return on stock k in quarter t, computed as , where is the return for stock k in month m. Lag ret k,t is the lagged quarterly return on stock k . Surprise k,t is defined as the unsplit adjusted I/B/E/S actual earnings per share for stock k in quarter t less the most recent I/B/E/S median forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the market price per share at the end of quarter t. Lag ΔInst k,t is the percentage change in aggregate institutional ownership in stock k from quarter t-2 to quarter t-1 and is defined in the same manner as the dependent variable, outlined above. The sample consists of 50,878 firm-quarters, during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008. Panel A presents the results of a series of quarterly Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions. Panel B presents the results of a pooled sample regression. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. The lagged recommendation change variables carry the expected signs and are both significant at less than the one percent level. Moreover, Wald tests reveal that the difference between the contemporaneous and lagged recommendation upgrade and downgrade variables are both statistically significant.
Aggregate institutional ownership and consensus recommendation changes
Consistent with the prior literature and the findings presented in Table 5 , ΔLiquid k,t , is positive (0.035) and highly significant. The positive association between changes in liquidity and changes in aggregate institutional ownership is consistent with frictions to institutional ownership easing as liquidity increases. Interestingly, changes in liquidity seem to drive changes in aggregate institutional ownership independently of changes in the measures of operating performance. The Pearson correlation between the change in liquidity and sales growth is just 2.3 percent while that between the lagged quarterly stock return and liquidity is only 6.7 percent. The coefficient on ΔVol k,t is negative in and significant at less than the eight percent level. This apparent preference for lower volatility amongst fund managers contradicts prior research, such as that of Del Guercio (1996 ), Falkenstein (1996 and Gompers and Metrick (2001) , who find that institutions exhibit a preference for more volatile stocks.
This inconsistency with the prior literature may reflect the different sample period considered. In particular, our sample period follows closely after the bursting of the technology bubble. The negative association between
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David Costello and Jason Hall UQ Business School, The University of Queensland changes in mutual fund holdings and changes in volatility in our sample period may therefore reflect a flight to safety following the substantial losses incurred during the earlier market downturn. The relation between sales growth and changes in aggregate institutional ownership is positive (0.051) and highly significant, suggesting that the funds in the sample have a preference for glamour stocks with strong recent operating performance.
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue persuasively that this preference is likely explained by the need for institutions to justify their portfolios to investors. Changes in aggregate institutional ownership are strongly positively related to the contemporaneous quarterly stock return and lagged quarterly stock return. The mean quarterly coefficient on Ret k,t is 0.113 and is highly significant. The mean quarterly coefficient on Lag ret k,t , is of a similar magnitude (0.150) and is also significant at less than the one percent level. This finding is in conformance with prior evidence that finds that mutual funds engage heavily in momentum trading (Grinblatt et al., 1995) .
There is no consistent relation between changes in aggregate institutional ownership and earnings surprise, computed in accordance with the procedure outlined by Doyle et al. (2006) . When the model is estimated on a quarterly basis, the coefficient on Surprise k,t is negative (-0.046) but insignificantly different from zero. In contrast, the coefficient on Surprise k,t in the pooled regression is positive (0.046) and highly significant. In light of the limited significance of the individual quarterly coefficients and their apparent instability, as evidenced by the frequency with which the quarterly coefficients switch from positive to negative, we interpret these results as supporting the conclusion that there is no relation between earnings surprise and changes in aggregate institutional ownership. This is perhaps unsurprising when one considers the evidence of Doyle et al. that the stocks that experience the greatest earnings surprise tend to be neglected stocks characterised by barriers to institutional ownership. The coefficient on the lagged quarterly change in aggregate institutional ownership, Lag ΔInst, is negative (-0.114) and significant at less than the one percent level. This result is inconsistent with institutions engaging in herding (Sias, 2004) . Rather, it is suggestive of a mean reverting process in aggregate institutional holdings, perhaps driven by the attempts of funds to exploit what they perceive to be temporary mispricing. Where, the dependent variable, , is the percentage change in aggregate institutional ownership for stock k from quarter t -1 to t and is the sum of the number of shares in stock k held by all institutional investors in the CRSP Mutual Funds database. Cons upgrade k,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the consensus recommendation for stock k in quarter t is more favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. Cons downgrade k,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the consensus recommendation for stock k in quarter t is less favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. Lag cons upgrade k,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the consensus recommendation for stock k in quarter t-1 is more favourable than that in quarter t-2 and 0 otherwise. Lag cons downgrade k,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the consensus recommendation for stock k in period t-1 is less favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-2 and 0 otherwise. ΔLiquid k,t is the percentage change in average daily trading volume in stock k from quarter t-1 to t. ΔVol k,t is the change in the standard deviation of firm k's daily stock returns from quarter t-1 to t. It is measured as ΔVol k,t = . Sales growth k,t is the sum of sales in the four most recent fiscal quarters (t-3 to t) divided by the sum of sales in quarters t-4 to t-7, minus one. Ret k,t is the return on stock k in quarter t, computed as , where is the stock return for stock k in month m. Lag ret k,t is the lagged quarterly return on stock k . Surprise k,t is defined as the unsplit adjusted I/B/E/S actual earnings per share for stock k in quarter t less the most recent I/B/E/S median forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the market price per share at the end of quarter t. Lag ΔInst k,t is the percentage change in aggregate institutional ownership in stock k from quarter t-2 to t-1 and is defined in the same manner as the dependent variable. The sample consists of 50,878 firm-quarters, during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008. Panel A presents the results of a series of quarterly Fama and Macbeth (1973) Accordingly, both our dependent and primary independent variables exhibit considerably more noise than prior studies.
Detailed mutual fund holdings and analyst recommendation changes
Contrary to the survey evidence that fund managers assign little weight to analyst recommendations (Institutional Investor, 2008) , the regression analysis presented in Table 7 provides strong support for the notion that their trading is influenced by the recommendation changes of sell-side analysts. On average, when an individual analyst upgrades their recommendation for a stock, the representative mutual fund responds by increasing the weight applied to that stock in their portfolio by 0.004 percent. Similarly, the representative fund responds to an individual analyst's recommendation downgrade by decreasing the weight applied to that stock in their portfolio by -0.006 percent. In total therefore, the average mutual fund increases their holdings of a stock that is upgraded by a single analyst by 0.010 percent relative to a stock that is downgraded by an analyst. In both instances, t-tests indicate that the change in mutual fund holdings is significant at less than the five percent level.
Moreover, this relation appears to be highly stable throughout the sample period. The quarterly coefficient on At first glance, the change in mutual fund holdings implied by our results may appear to be economically insignificant. However, the small magnitude of these changes is unsurprising when one considers that the funds in our sample hold just 0.62 percent of their total net assets in any single stock. The economic impact of these changes is further brought into focus when one considers that the reaction we report is that of a single fund to the recommendation change of a single analyst.
Contrary to the findings of prior research (Del Guercio, 1996; Gompers and Metrick 2001) and the results presented in Tables 1 and 2 , above, the mean coefficient on ΔLiquid k,t is negative and highly significant. This result may be consistent with the notion that fund managers seek to exploit instances of mispricing in illiquid stocks because the greater efficiency of highly liquid stocks makes it difficult to generate abnormal returns. The coefficients on ΔVol k,t and Sales growth k,t are negative but insignificant at usual levels of significance. Consistent with the findings of Grinblatt et al. (1995) , the coefficients on Ret k,t and Lag ret k,t-1 are positive and strongly significant, implying that many of the funds in our sample use price momentum as a stock selection criterion. In contrast, there is no apparent relation between the proxy for earnings momentum, Surprise k,t , and changes in mutual fund holdings. This result is consistent with the findings presented in Table 5 and Table 6 , above, and likely reflects the existence of barriers to institutional ownership amongst the stocks that experience the greatest earnings surprise (Doyle, 2006) . In accordance with prior research that finds that institutional investors engage in heard-like behaviour (Sias, 2004) , the coefficient on ΔInst k,t, the contemporaneous quarterly change in aggregate institutional ownership is positive and highly significant. Note, however, that the significantly negative coefficient on Lag ΔHolding i,k,t-1 suggests that the change in a fund's holdings of a stock in the current quarter is strongly negatively associated with its change in holdings in the prior quarter. The process of mean reversion in holdings that this implies is consistent with the notion that the fund managers in our sample attempt to exploit what they perceive to be instances of temporary mispricing.
Business School, The University of Queensland Sales growth k,t is the sum of sales in the four most recent fiscal quarters (t-3 to t) divided by the sum of sales in quarters t-4 to t-7, minus one. Ret k,t is the return on stock k in quarter t, computed as , where is the stock return for stock k in month m. Lag ret k,t is the lagged quarterly return on stock k . Surprise k,t is defined as the unsplit adjusted I/B/E/S actual earnings per share for stock k in quarter t less the most recent I/B/E/S median forecast preceding the announcement date, scaled by the market price per share at the end of quarter t. Lag ΔInst k,t is the percentage change in aggregate institutional ownership in stock k from quarter t-2 to quarter t-1 and is defined in the same manner as the dependent variable, outlined above. The sample consists of 6,535,255 quarterly observations during the period from the third quarter of 2003 to the final quarter of 2008. Panel, A presents the results of a series of quarterly Fama and Macbeth (1973) regressions. Panel B presents the results of a pooled sample regression. *,**,*** indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. # denotes instances where the coefficient on Upgrade j,k,t (Lag upgrade ,k,t- 
Persistence in analyst influence
To assess the influence of an analyst's recommendation changes on the trading of mutual funds, we employ a two-stage least squares regression framework. In the first stage, we estimate the predicted change in a fund's holdings of a stock associated with factors other than an analyst's recommendation change by estimating the following regression: 
In the second stage, we regress the residuals from (1), which reflect the component of a fund's change in holdings that is unexplained by the control variables, against the contemporaneous and lagged recommendation change indicator variables, as follows: To test whether analysts exhibit persistence in their influence on the trading of mutual funds, we allocate analysts to groups of above-and below-median influence based on their mean influence rank during the pre-test period from the third quarter of 2003 to the first quarter of 2006. The composition of these groups is then held constant throughout the subsequent 11 quarter test period. At the end of the test-period the mean influence ranks of the groups are re-measured and a two-sample t-test is performed to determine whether there is a significant difference in their ranks. In this analysis, a finding that the mean influence rank of the above-median influence group remains significantly greater than that of the below-median group would support the inference that there are certain analysts who persistently influence the trading of mutual funds. In an attempt to understand the characteristics that make an analyst influential in the trading of mutual funds, we also measure the mean tenure and trades for the two groups of analysts. We define tenure as the number of quarters during the sample in which The results presented in Table 8 and depicted in Figure 1 support the notion that there are certain analysts whose recommendation changes consistently influence the trading of mutual funds. Almost three years after analysts were allocated to influence groups based on their formation period ranks, the analysts identified as being most influential remain significantly more influential than their peers. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there appears to be some degree of mean reversion in the influence of analysts as the sample period progresses. Over the test period of 11 quarters, the mean influence rank of the above-median influence group declines from 65 percent to 56 percent. In contrast, that of the below-median group increases from 31 percent to 43 percent. Nonetheless, the difference between the mean influence ranks of the above-and below-median groups, 13 percent, is highly statistically significant. 
test influence rankings of analysts and above-and below-median influence
This figure depicts the pre-and post-test mean influence ranks of analysts identified as being of above-and below-median influence in the pre-test period. The mean influence rank proxies for an analyst's relative influence on the trading of mutual funds and is estimated as follows: First, we regress the quarterly change in a fund's holdings of a stock, ΔHolding i,k,t against the control variables from equation (1) in order to estimate the expected change in holdings associated with factors other than an analyst's recommendation changes. We then regress the residuals from this regression on the recommendation change indicator variables and estimate the Cook's D influence measures associated with the coefficients. Next, we compute an average Cook's D influence measure across all stocks covered by an analyst within a quarter, and assign each analyst a percentile ranking based on the average Cook's D statistic associated with their recommendations within the quarter. We then average an analyst's quarterly percentile rankings longitudinally over the first 11 quarters of the sample, sort the analysts into groups of above and below median influence and measure the mean influence rank of the groups. The composition of these groups is held constant during the remaining 11 quarters and the mean influence ranks are remeasured at the end of the sample period.
Interestingly, a defining feature of the most influential analysts appears to be their greater tenure than less influential analysts. On average, analysts in the above-median influence group appeared in the database in 6.0 of the 11 quarters to the end of the test period, while those in the below-median group appeared an average of 5.2 times. Though seemingly small in an absolute sense, this difference is significant at less than the one percent level. At the end of the test period, the average tenure of the above-median group (10.68 quarters) remains significantly greater than that of the below-median influence group (9.57 quarters). The Pearson and Spearman correlations presented Table 9 in confirm the inferences drawn from the test of persistence in analyst influence. The Pearson correlation between an analyst's tenure and their mean influence rank is positive (0.126) and highly significant, implying that the most influential analysts also tend to be more experienced. That there is a positive relation between an analyst's tenure and their influence on the trading of mutual funds emerges clearly from the results presented in Tables 8 and 9 . The direction of causality in this relation, however, is less clear. Two hypotheses could be put forward to explain such a relation. The first, the natural selection hypothesis, implies that influential analysts are somehow more skilful than their peers and achieve longer tenure because their recommendations prompt institutional trading, generating commissions for their brokerage firms and ensuring their continued employment. In contrast, analysts who are uninfluential generate few commissions, cease to be employed and drop out of the sample. An alternative theory, the perceived market feel hypothesis, suggests that analysts acquire greater influence as their tenure increases because fund managers interpret their experience as a signal of quality. According to this view, analysts with greater tenure are perceived by fund managers to possess some intangible 'feel for the market' gained through many years of experience that makes their recommendations more informative. While the present study affords no opportunity to distinguish between these hypotheses, identifying the direction of causality in this relation poses an interesting challenge for further research.
Analyst skill and influence
In this section we examine whether recommendations issued by analysts included in the Institutional Investor All-American Research Team exert more influence on the trading of mutual funds than those of their less heralded peers. Consistent with the results in Table 8 , the more influential All-American analysts exhibit significantly greater tenure than their less acclaimed peers. On average, All-American analysts appear in the sample in approximately 13 of the 22 quarters. In contrast, other analysts appear in the sample an average of eight times. Moreover, the results in Table 11 is driven by their greater skills, which ensure that they continue to be employed and remain in the sample.
Equally, however, it is consistent with the notion that analysts acquire influence and are more likely to become an
All-American as their tenure increases.
Granger causality
It is well documented in the literature that changes in institutional ownership are positively associated with future stock returns (Lakonishok et al., 1992) . It is therefore possible that institutional trading causes changes in analyst recommendations as opposed to analyst recommendations informing the trading of mutual funds. We confront this threat by including an analyst's recommendation change in the prior quarter as an independent variable in the regression analysis. By flow of time, therefore, any relation between mutual fund trading in the current quarter and an analyst's recommendation change in the prior quarter must flow from the analyst's 39 David Costello and Jason Hall UQ Business School, The University of Queensland recommendation change to the trading of mutual funds. In reality, however, the contemporaneous relation between mutual fund trading and analyst recommendation changes may flow in the opposite direction.
Alternatively, the true relation may be described by a complex feedback process in which the trading of mutual funds causes analysts to change their recommendations and analyst recommendation changes cause mutual funds to trade. To examine these issues, we adopt the approach advocated by Granger (1969) and conduct a series of tests to determine the direction of causality in the relation between the trading of mutual funds and analyst recommendation changes.
The bi-variate Granger causality model between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst recommendation changes can be expressed as follows: 
In this analysis a finding that β 1 and β 2 are significantly different from zero is consistent with the notion that changes in analyst recommendations Granger cause changes in mutual fund holdings. Equally, significant coefficients on δ 1 and φ 1 would be consistent with mutual fund trading Granger causing changes in analyst recommendations. Finally, a finding that β 1, β 2 , δ 1 and φ 1 are all significantly different from zero would be consistent with the notion that the relation between analyst recommendation changes and mutual fund trading is described by a feedback system in which analyst recommendation changes cause mutual funds to trade and mutual fund trading causes analyst recommendation changes.
The results of the Granger causality tests, presented in Table 12 , indicate the existence of a feedback relation between analyst recommendation changes and the trading of mutual funds. The flow of causality from analyst recommendations to the trading of mutual funds is supported by the significantly positive coefficients on causality suggests that the relation between the trading of mutual funds and analyst recommendations is considerably more complex than has previously been acknowledged.
Table 12: Granger causality tests
This table presents tests of the direction of causality between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst recommendations. The first column describes the independent variables in each specification. Columns 2 -4 set out the average quarterly coefficients of regressions with alternate dependent variables. In the second column, the dependent variable is ΔHolding i,k,t . the change in the proportion of fund i's total net assets invested in stock k from quarter t-1 to quarter t, adjusted to remove the impact of price changes in the stocks comprising the fund's portfolio and changes in funds under management associated with redemptions and new investment. It is computed as , where, , and N t is the number of shares held by fund i in stock k , P t-1 is the price of stock k as at the date the fund reported its holdings in quarter t-1 and ω i,k,t-1 is the unadjusted proportion of fund i's total net assets invested in stock k at the end of quarter t, as reported by CRSP. In the third column, the dependent variable is Upgrade j,k,t , an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j's recommendation for stock k in quarter t is more favourable than that outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. In the fourth column, the dependent variable is Downgrade j,k,t , an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if analyst j's recommendation for stock k in quarter t is less favourable that that outstanding in quarter t-1 and 0 otherwise. 
Summary and conclusions
The literature surrounding the influence of sell-side analyst recommendations on the trading of mutual funds has been characterised by a divide between the empirical and survey evidence. The survey evidence consistently records the claims of funds managers that although they value other aspects of sell-side analyst research, they assign little weight to analyst recommendations when making portfolio decisions. Survey responses, however, are not always a reliable indicator of actual behaviour. Indeed, in one of the few empirical studies to address this question, Chen and Cheng (2006) report a strong contemporaneous relation between changes in aggregate institutional ownership and the consensus recommendation for a stock. However, making robust inferences about the direction of causality in the contemporaneous relation between changes in mutual fund holdings and analyst recommendations is problematic. The contemporaneous relation that Chen and Cheng (2006) describe could equally be consistent with analysts changing their recommendations in response to institutional trading. Our study
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David Costello and Jason Hall UQ Business School, The University of Queensland therefore meets the pressing need to undertake definitive, large-sample empirical analysis to understand the behaviour of these important capital market participants.
We focus on three fundamental questions surrounding the manner in which mutual funds use the research of sell-side analysts. First, do mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with analyst recommendation changes?
Second, do mutual funds persistently trade in a manner consistent with the recommendation changes of certain influential analysts? And finally, do the analysts rated most by fund managers in the Institutional Investor surveys exhibit greater influence on the trading of mutual funds than other analysts?
To address the first research question, we draw on the rich panel of individual mutual fund holdings and detailed analyst recommendations. In contrast, prior studies consider only changes in aggregate institutional ownership and consensus recommendations. While we undertake analysis at this level, we also extend the literature by conducting the analysis at the individual fund and analyst level. An implication of this research design is that our study is by far the most comprehensive of the relation between mutual fund trading and analyst recommendations undertaken to date. Moreover, our study is the first in this stream of literature to incorporate the prior quarter recommendation change as an independent variable in the regression analysis. This secures the validity of inferences as to the direction of causality in the relation between mutual fund trading and analyst recommendations, as prior quarter recommendation changes cannot be influenced by trades executed by fund managers in the subsequent quarter.
The results that emerge from this robust research design provide compelling evidence that mutual funds trade in a manner consistent with consensus and individual analyst recommendation changes. This finding contradicts the claims of fund managers that they take little notice of analyst recommendations when determining the composition of their portfolios. It therefore highlights the importance of undertaking large-sample empirical analysis to understand the complex behaviour of investors.
Furthermore, to examine the possibility of reverse causality or a feedback relation between mutual fund trading, we estimate a series of Granger causality tests. The results of this analysis suggest that the relation between mutual fund trading and analyst recommendations is considerably more complex than has previously been acknowledged in the literature. In particular, we find that there is a feedback relation between changes in mutual fund holdings and recommendation changes. We adopt a two-stage least squares regression framework to test whether analysts identified as most influential in a pre-test period continue to exhibit greater influence than their peers during the test period. The results of this analysis support the hypothesis that the most influential analysts exhibit persistence in their influence on the trading of mutual funds in subsequent periods.
Finally, our results provide a clue as to the characteristics of analysts who exert the greatest influence on the trading of mutual funds. We find that analysts rated most highly by portfolio managers in the Institutional Investor surveys exert significantly greater influence on the trading of these managers than their less heralded peers. Moreover, we find a strong positive relation between an analyst's tenure, the influence they exert on the trading of mutual funds and their status as an All-American analyst.
